When presented with a difficult perceptual decision, human observers are able to make metacognitive judgements of subjective certainty. Such judgements can be made independently of and prior to any overt response to a sensory stimulus, presumably via internal monitoring. Retrospective judgements about one's own task performance, on the other hand, require first that the subject perform a task and thus could potentially be made based on motor processes, proprioceptive, and other sensory feedback rather than internal monitoring. With this dichotomy in mind, we set out to study performance monitoring using a brain-computer interface (BCI), with which subjects could voluntarily perform an actionmoving a cursor on a computer screen -without any movement of the body, and thus without somatosensory feedback. Real-time visual feedback was available to subjects during training, but not during the experiment where the true final position of the cursor was only revealed after the subject had estimated where s/he thought it had ended up after 6 s of BCI-based cursor control. During the first half of the experiment subjects based their assessments primarily on the prior probability of the end position of the cursor on previous trials. However, during the second half of the experiment subjects' judgements moved significantly closer to the true end position of the cursor, and away from the prior. This suggests that subjects can monitor task performance when the task is performed without overt movement of the body.
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Introduction
Studies of performance monitoring necessarily involve the performance of a task, and performance of a task, where performance is measured, invariably involves movement of the body (in order to register a response), even if only a single finger. Even without experimentally-delivered feedback the subject will at a minimum have proprioceptive and tactile feedback, and likely also visual (e.g. seeing one's own finger press a button) and auditory feedback, and any one of these could be used to infer which response was given and/or how well the task was performed.
In studies of perception of weak or ambiguous stimuli, on the other hand, it is possible to ask subjects, ''how sure are you of what you just saw/heard/felt?". This kind of ''second-order" judgement can be made independently of and prior to any feedback, and presumably requires internal evaluation of the quality of the neuronal evidence, also referred to as metacognition (Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012; Metcalfe, 1996; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Miele, Wager, Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) . Previous research has looked at metacognition of somatosensory perception (Hilgenstock, Weiss, & Witte, 2014) and attention (Kerr, Sacchet, Lazar, Moore, & Jones, 2013; Whitmarsh, Barendregt, Schoffelen, & Jensen, 2014) , but not motor imagery, and not in the context of braincomputer interface (BCI) control.
Theorists have raised the distinction between decisional and post-decisional loci of metacognition in the context of an evidence-accumulation framework (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) . The primary task involves accumulation of sensory evidence up to a threshold, which, when reached, gives way to an overt response. In decisional-locus models, the very same information encoded by the neuronal decision variable (DV) is used to make both the first-order response and the second-order (metacognitive) judgement. Post-decisional locus models hold that processing of stimulus information continues even after the decision threshold is reached, leading potentially to changes-of-mind (Kaufman, Churchland, Ryu, & Shenoy, 2015) and, importantly, contributing to retrospective judgements of decision confidence (Murphy, Robertson, Harty, & O'Connell, 2015) .
While it has been argued that performance monitoring and metacognition are governed by common principles, previous authors have suggested that a distinction be drawn between the two, and in particular the metacognition of agency (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Miele et al., 2011; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008) . Importantly, confidence judgements are thought to rely on neural processing in the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and possibly in areas of the parietal cortex as well (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009) , whereas error monitoring has been reliably linked to activity in the anterior-cingulate cortex (ACC) (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994) . With these details in mind it is instructive to distinguish between two kinds of self monitoring:
(1) Monitoring of one's own bodily movements or bodily state. For example, one estimates one's own reaction time by monitoring the delay between stimulus onset and proprioceptive signals from the responding hand. (2) Monitoring of one's own brain activity, without relying on any signals from the body. For example estimating the quality of sensory evidence by directly probing neural activity in the relevant areas of sensory cortex. We set out to ask whether the latter kind of self monitoring, which is possible for sensory-evoked processes (metacognition for perception), is also possible for neural activity that is endogenously and voluntarily generated (performance monitoring for BCI action).
We posed this question using a motor-imagery-based (MIbased) brain-computer interface (BCI), with which subjects could voluntarily perform an action (moving a cursor on a computer screen) without any movement of the body and in the absence of any movement-related somatosensory feedback. Importantly, cursor-movement feedback was only visible to subjects during a pre-experiment practice session. No on-line visual feedback was given during the actual BCI experiment, during which the true final position of the cursor was only revealed to the subject at the end of each trial, after s/he had estimated where s/he thought the cursor had ended up after 6 s of BCI control.
Results show that during the first half of the experiment (minimum 120 trials) subjects based their assessments on the prior probability of the end position of the cursor on previous trials. However, during the second half of the experiment subjects' judgements moved significantly closer to the actual end position of the cursor, and away from the prior. This suggests not only that subjects can monitor performance of a task performed without movement, but also that this capacity can be learned. We conclude that internal monitoring is possible, not only for sensory-evoked neural activity (Fleming, Huijgen, & Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) , but also for voluntarily generated patterns of brain activity used in BCI control.
Materials and methods

Participants
For as yet unknown reasons, a substantial proportion of people who attempt to control a motor-imagery-based BCI are unable to do so -a phenomenon known as ''BCI illiteracy" (Vidaurre & Blankertz, 2010) . With this in mind, we pre-screened seventeen potential participants for their ability to control the BCI after an initial training session. Of these, four were not able to perform the task well enough (see below under ''Practice with real time visual feedback") and another six were unable to perform the task at all (the BCI classifier was unable to adequately fit the training data). This left seven subjects, all males, right handed, aged 27.4 ± 2.9 years old (mean ± SD). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave informed consent prior to participation. The study was undertaken in accordance with the ethical standard as defined in the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the local ethics research committee at the University of Lausanne.
Electroencephalography (EEG) recordings
Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded from a 27-channel montage centered over the sensorimotor cortex at a sampling rate of 256 Hz (g.tec, Schiedelberg, Austria) as used previously (Evans, Gale, Schurger, & Blanke, 2015; Marchesotti et al. , submitted for publication). Electrodes were grounded by an additional electrode placed on the forehead, and then re-referenced to electrodes attached to the earlobes. Data were processed in real-time using a custom Simulink model (Mathworks, Natick, Massachusetts, USA), with 256 classifier decisions per second smoothed by taking the average within a 1-s sliding window. Real-time BCI data processing methods are described in detail elsewhere (Guger et al., 2000) .
Protocol and paradigm
The experiment took place during a single recording session of about 1-2 h (two recording sessions on two consecutive days for S1). During all recordings, subjects were comfortably seated about 50 cm away from a computer display with their hands on their laps (palms up).
BCI training procedure
Participants first performed a lateralized motor imagery task without visual feedback (Fig. 1) . The data from this task were used to train the classifier. Subjects performed 2 blocks of 40 trials each (20 with left cue and 20 with right cue, randomly interleaved). The subjects had to alternatively perform left-and right-hand motor imagery (MI): While staying completely immobile and keeping their gaze on a fixation cross, the subjects had to imagine the sensation of moving their right (or left) hand (e.g. squeezing an imaginary ball) for 6 s according to a visual cue (arrow) pointing to the right (or left). Subjects were made aware of the difference between forming a visual image of their hand moving and imagining the somato-motor sensation associated with moving their hand, and were asked to do the latter.
Each trial started with the appearance on the screen of a fixation cross and a cue (an arrow pointing to the right or to the left) which remained on for 2 s (Fig. 1) . Then the arrow disappeared cueing the subject to initiate MI. After 6 s, the fixation cross disappeared, indicating to the subject that s/he can relax (move, blink, etc.) for 3-3.6 s (drawn randomly from a uniform distribution). Then a new trial started with the appearance of the fixation cross and the cue on the screen.
We used the Common Spatial Patterns (CSP) decomposition (Blankertz, Tomioka, Lemm, Kawanabe, & Muller, 2008) for dimensionality reduction and feature selection, and used linear discriminant analysis (LDA) to train the classifier (Parra, Spence, Gerson, & Sajda, 2005) . We used the first two and last two spatial patterns in the ranking returned from the CSP procedure as inputs to the classifier, and hence our feature space had four dimensions.
Practice with real-time visual feedback
After training the classifier, subjects performed 1 or 2 practice blocks of 40 trials each (20 with left cue and 20 with right cue) with real-time visual feedback in the form of a horizontal rectangular cursor moving either to the left or to the right on the video monitor. The trials were structured in exactly the same way as for the training of the classifier (see above). The only difference was that during the MI period, subjects received real-time visual feedback of their classified MI decisions. The cursor moved to the left for left-classified time frames and to the right for rightclassified time frames. Subjects were asked to keep their gaze on the fixation cross throughout the duration of each trial. If the cursor failed to consistently move in the cued direction (performance below 70%; i.e. more than 30% of the time frames were incorrectly classified), then the subject was excluded from the experiment.
Main experiment: trials without visual feedback
Subjects with a performance above 70% with real-time visual feedback went on to perform between 6 and 10 blocks of 40 trials each (20 with left cue and 20 with right cue) without real-time visual feedback ( Fig. 2 ; S1 did 5 blocks on each of the 2 consecutive days; S2, S4, S6 and S7 did 7 blocks in one recording session; S3 and S5 did 6 blocks in one recording session). As above, the subjects had to perform left-hand or right-hand MI according to the cue, but this time they did not receive any real-time visual feedback. At the end of the 6 s of MI, the subject was asked: ''Where do you believe that your motor imagery brought you?" and a scale between À10 and 10 (0 in the middle of the screen) appeared. They had to say out loud what number on the scale was closest to where they thought the cursor would have ended its course. After they reported a number, the cursor was displayed on top of the scale, at its last classified position. Except for the question and delayed visual feedback, the delays of the trials remained the same as during training. Throughout the experiment, subjects were monitored by the experimenter for overt movement of the hands, arms, and eyes. All subjects were relaxed and still throughout the experiment.
Data analyses and statistical tests 2.4.1. Subject classification performance measurement
Classification performance was calculated as the percentage of time points that the cursor moved in the cued direction, independently of whether or not the cursor was visible (trials with real-time visual feedback) or hidden (trials without real-time visual feedback). Therefore, classification performance corresponded to the percentage of time a subjects' brain remained in the state associated with MI of the cued hand (see: Evans et al., 2015) .
Trial-by-trial cursor measurements
In addition to the subjects' response of where they thought the cursor was at the end of a trial, we recorded the actual final position of the cursor (referred to as the real position henceforth). We also considered the possibility that an internally computed prior of the final cursor position, based on that of previous trials, factored into subjects' responses. To calculate this prior, we added the real position of each trial to a distribution, and re-calculated the average of this distribution after each trial. In this manner our estimate of the prior was updated on a per-trial basis.
Model fit
To assess the extent to which the prior and the real position influenced the response of the subjects, we fit pooled data with a simple linear model:
where x was the estimated prior of the position, y the real position of the cursor, z the response of the subject, a is the bias parameter, Fig. 2 . Experimental protocol. The subject was cued to perform either right-hand or left-hand motor imagery. No feedback was given during the BCI-control (motor imagery) period -only the fixation cross remained on the screen. After 6 s the subject was presented with a continuous scale from [À10, 10] which s/he could click on with the mouse to indicate where s/he thought the cursor had ended up after the 6 s of motor imagery. Fig. 1 . BCI training and practice protocol. The subject was first cued to perform either right-hand or left-hand motor imagery, and then initiated motor imagery on disappearance of the cue. During the training phase there was no online feedback. During the practice phase (just after training the BCI) online feedback was presented in the form of a small square cursor that moved horizontally to the left or right. The BCI control period lasted for 6 s after which the screen was blank (black background) for 3 s before the next trial began. and b and c are the coefficients for the prior and real position terms, respectively.
Bootstrap test
A standard bootstrap analysis was used to compare the first half to the second half of the data. Distributions for each metric (e.g. difference between response and prior) were first built by recalculating it 10,000 times on different subsets of pooled trials by randomly resampling subsets of N trials, with replacement, from the complete set of N trials pooled from all subjects. For a metric to be considered significant, more than 95% of its bootstrapped estimates had to be either greater or smaller than the corresponding estimate it was being compared to (for a detailed description see : Prsa, Gale, & Blanke, 2012) .
Results
Performance is similar with and without real-time visual feedback
Overall, there was no change in BCI-control performance when real-time visual feedback was eliminated (Fig. 3A) . S3 was the only subject who showed a noticeable drop in performance without real-time visual feedback. The other subjects were not affected by the lack of real-time visual feedback, suggesting that participants do not need a closed loop to accurately exercise BCI control. Feedback may, however, be essential for the learning of MI-BCI control, and since we did provide feedback during practice our results suggest that, after practicing with feedback, subsequent removal of the feedback may not significantly affect performance. Examination of the topographical plots of CSP weights for each subject confirmed that electrodes over sensorimotor hand regions contralateral to the cued side had the largest weights, consistent with the subjects being engaged in MI during the experiment (Fig. 3B) . The same CSP weights and classifier were used with and without real-time visual feedback.
Internal assessments of the subjects are closer to an estimated prior of the position than the real underlying position of the cursor
The difference between the response and the real position of the cursor and the difference between the response and the estimated prior for right and left MI trials were computed. Both appear to be normally distributed, with a mean not significantly different from 0 (one-sample t-test: p > 0.05 in both cases). On the other hand, the variances of the two distributions were significantly different (Levene's test: p < 0.001) with the difference between the response and the actual position having greater variance than the difference between the response and the prior. This suggests that responses were more tightly linked to the prior (smaller variance) than they were to the actual end position of the cursor.
It is possible that the capacity for subjects to internally assess their own MI performance was learned over the course of the experiment, and thus might not appear in the average over the entire experiment. To check for this, we separately analyzed the pooled data from the first and second half of the experiment, in order to ascertain whether or not subjects demonstrated some learning with time, characterized by performance changes between the single-trial cursor position estimation and the actual cursor position (Fig. 4) .
With time, subjects learn to assess the real end position of the cursor
When comparing the first half and second half of the trials, we found that the difference between the response and the real position decreased significantly (bootstrap test: p < 0.01) -i.e. subjects' responses moved closer to the true location. By contrast, the difference between the response and the estimated prior did not change significantly (p = 0.297). The difference between these two changes was significant (bootstrap test: p < 0.001). We tested the robustness of these results with a leave-one-out analysis, where each error value (e.g. first half difference from prior, etc.) was re-calculated using 6 of 7 subjects and then added to a distribution. This analysis confirmed that our results were not driven by any individual subject, as the mean difference between subjects' responses and the real position still changed significantly from the first half to the second half of the experiment (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0.016). This suggests that subjects can learn to directly assess their MI performance without recourse to on-line external feedback. Fig. 3 . Classifier performance and common spatial pattern weights. Left: subject performance during the practice session (with feedback) and the experimental session (without feedback) measured as percentage of time frames the cursor moved in the cued direction. Criteria of 70% is shown (cutoff for subject participation, based on the practice session). Right: CSP weights, normalized to 1 (red) and À1 (blue), for left and right MI for each subject. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
A simple model was used to account for the influence of the estimated prior and the real final cursor position on subjects' responses. The model was fit to pooled data for the first half and second half of the experiment separately (cue direction was ignored). The coefficients for this model fit were then compared (Fig. 5) . The 99% confidence intervals for the bias term overlapped with 0 in both the first and second halves of the experiment, consistent with the subjects not systematically favoring one direction (right/left) over the other in their responses. The prior coefficient was relatively high in both cases, with 99% confidence intervals that did not overlap with 0 in either direction, which suggests an effect of the prior on the responses of the subject throughout the experiment. However the value of the prior coefficient was significantly smaller in the second half when compared to the first (bootstrap test: p = 0.008; Fig. 5 ), indicating a smaller contribution of the prior to subjects' responses as the experiment progressed. Finally, the 99% confidence interval for the real position coefficient overlapped zero for the first half of the experiment, but was significantly greater than 0 for the second half of the experiment. Statistical comparisons also showed that the value of the real position coefficient was significantly larger in the second half of the experiment when compared to the first (bootstrap test: p < 0.001), indicating it had a larger and more significant contribution as the experiment progressed. Repeating the leave-one-out analysis outlined above, we found that no individual subject introduced any significant bias into the prior or real position coefficients (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p < 0.05). Taken together, the results of the model-fit analysis show that although subjects based their responses in part on prior feedback throughout the experiment, by the second half they had learned to assess their own level of task performance, represented by the real end position coefficient, while simultaneously decreasing the weight of the prior on their responses.
Discussion
Imagine that you were asked to walk in a straight line, putting one foot directly in front of the other. While walking the line you were then asked ''are you doing a good job of walking in a straight line?" In this context, you could use many strategies to answer that question: You could monitor the stability of the visual scene, you could monitor vestibular activity for signs that you are swaying back and forth, or you could monitor proprioceptive signals from your leg muscles to see how often and how strongly you are making corrective adjustments (a lot of adjustments might signal poor balance and coordination). Through this example we see that being able to monitor one's own task performance, make corrections to errors as they happen, and adapt behavior to avoid future errors (Miele et al., 2011) can be carried out by perceiving and processing one's own actions via sensory and proprioceptive channels. Thus in the context of motor-action performance monitoring, the roles of sensory feedback and direct internal monitoring are difficult to tease apart.
But what happens when the thinking itself becomes the action, or, put another way, when the action to be performed is to voluntarily form a particular thought? This is the question that we posed here using a brain-computer interface, which reads out and interprets the presence of a given thought (imagining performing a specific motor act) as a control command which is then relayed to an external device. In this context, there is no proprioceptive or tactile feedback, and in the absence of any sensory feedback, which we did not provide during the experiment, one way to estimate one's own task performance is for the brain to read out one of the relevant variables -e.g. the relative alpha and/or beta power in left versus right somatosensory and motor cortices -directly from the brain.
Although subjects were not immediately able to do this, they did show significant signs of BCI metacognition during the second half of the experiment. Visual performance feedback was given to subjects only at the end of each trial, after they had registered their metacognitive performance estimate, and this delayed feedback could have enabled the learning of the necessary internal contingencies to be able to perform this higher-level task. To our knowledge, this type of self-monitoring has not previously been demonstrated.
Feedback is widely known to be essential for learning, and prior BCI work has been unequivocal in showing the importance of online sensory feedback in learning BCI control (Gomez-Rodriguez et al., 2011; Ramos-Murguialday et al., 2012; Soekadar et al., 2011) . In the present study, outside of the practice sessions, sensory feedback was significantly delayed, not being delivered until after the subject had performed motor imagery and assessed their own performance. Also, feedback was in a different modality (visual) form the one in which imagery was performed (somatomotor). Thus it is not surprising that learning the performancemonitoring task was relatively slow, emerging only after the first half of the experiment.
One question that naturally comes up in this context is which brain areas are involved in mediating the performance of this task. Unfortunately our EEG equipment was specifically designed for BCI use and lacked the full scalp coverage necessary to infer the likely locus or loci involved. In particular our electrode montage did not cover the frontal brain areas commonly thought to be involved in metacognition. One likely candidate in this instance is the rostrolateral PFC which has been implicated in retrospective judgements of task performance (Fleming, Huijgen, et al., 2012) . Also, the dorsal pre-frontal cortex has been shown to be more active when subjects direct their attention internally towards their own motor intention (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004) , and the same may be true for the intention to perform motor imagery.
If we assume that the feedback on trials when the subject gets close to the target is rewarding, then reinforcement learning provides a framework within which to interpret these results. This points towards the basal ganglia (notably the striatum) and their interaction with cortical structures (in particular in the prefrontal cortex) as a likely mechanism (Graybiel, 2005) . Prior work has implicated the basal ganglia in learning to control a BCI (Hinterberger et al., 2005; Koralek, Costa, & Carmena, 2013; Koralek, Jin, Long Ii, Costa, & Carmena, 2012) , and in motor imagery more generally (Decety, 1996) , lending support to this speculation.
One limitation of the present research is that it is difficult to rule out the possibility that subjects were monitoring their overall level of vigilance or task engagement on each trial, and using that to infer how far they succeeded in moving the cursor. However, this would beg the question of why the effect manifests only in the second half of the experiment. Presumably, monitoring one's own level of vigilance or task engagement would not require training. Given that the classifier was trained specifically on spectral power in the alpha and beta bands (passband from 8 to 30 Hz), our results are consistent with subjective estimates of task performance being based on an internal readout of spectral power modulations in the alpha and beta bands.
Note that, while we controlled for overt movements, we cannot rule out the possibility of covert or sub-threshold muscle activity. However, a recent study recording electro-oculographic (EOG) and electromyographic (EMG) activity found no task-related effects in either of these variables (Kasahara, DaSalla, Honda, & Hanakawa, 2015) . Most importantly, we point out that our primary aim was to operate in a context where actions were performed without overt movement, which is satisfied whether or not the body is recruited at sub-threshold levels during motor imagery (Jeannerod, 1995) .
Our approach helps to highlight a distinction between internal monitoring of brain activity by the brain, versus monitoring of the sensory and proprioceptive signals evoked by one's own behavioral output, in lieu of task demands. The latter is arguably a firstorder operation, perhaps not fundamentally different from monitoring the task performance of another person, whereas the former is certainly a second-order, meta-cognitive operation. These points may be debatable, but our data and results bring this question to the foreground and are consistent with the interpretation that we have offered. Further research will be required to delimit the circumstances under which direct internal monitoring can be confirmed and secondary sensory/proprioceptive processing can be ruled out.
